This essay focuses on the impact of recent changes in corporate governance on ethical behavior within the public corporation. It argues that a style of corporate behavior-one characterized by a risk tolerant, even reckless, pursuit of short-term profits and a disregard for the interests of non-shareholder constituencies-is attributable in significant part to recent changes in corporate governance, including the rise of hedge fund activism, greater use of incentive compensation, and the appearance of blockholder directors. It then surveys feasible responses intended to strengthen the role of the boards as the corporation's conscience and superego. Given the difficulty of reform, it predicts that the problems identified are likely to get worse before they get better.
consider only the short-run. Most public companies do behave responsibly (at least most of the time).
Nor is it denied that boards should seek to maximize shareholder value over the long-run, even if that implies losses for other stakeholders. Rather, what is contended is that activist pressure tends to curb the board's discretion to (1) plan for the long term; (2) disdain questionable or unethical behavior; and (3) accommodate the legitimate interests of other stakeholders.
In particular, as activist pressure increases, the role of the board as the corporation's superego is gradually marginalized and possibly eclipsed. This term "superego" may seem out of place here, more appropriate to a discussion of Freudian psychology than corporate law and economics. But this article is premised on the belief that the board of the public corporation has traditionally played such a role as the corporate organ most likely to exercise restraint, to recognize ethical limits on profit maximization, and to accommodate other stakeholders. At least until recently, boards at public companies approached decision-making with a distinctive style that was deliberative, collegial, consensus-seeking and at least slightly risk-averse. If a proposed policy or course of action carried legal or reputational risk or would prejudice the interests of other stakeholders, this was a reason for many boards to disfavor it, or at least to exercise caution. 2 Yet, this risk-averse bias was probably grounded on a particular set of relationships among the board, management, and the corporation's shareholders, which relationships have now changed. As a result, not only will more risk be tolerated, but also the very idea of the board as a cohesive, collegial body may be yielding to a different conception of the board as a collection of proxies for specific groups of shareholders. Fragmented and factionalized, such a board would represent a weaker superego (if it still played that role at all).
Discussions of corporate ethics and social responsibility often tend to be more aspirational and exhortative than diagnostic. In contrast, this article seeks to provide an economic foundation for both its critique and its prescriptions. Ultimately, it will offer both a rationale and specific reforms to enhance the these transitions to segment modern corporate history into three periods. Finally, Part IV turns to how a stronger corporate superego might be developed and protected.
II. Risky Business: The Valeant Story
Few firms have achieved notoriety as quickly as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International.
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Valeant's basic business model was to buy prescription drugs (or the companies owning those drugs) and then raise the prices of those drugs astronomically-up to 600% or more. When Valeant acquired the entire company, it typically slashed or eliminated the acquired company's own "research and development" budget and spiked prices on its existing product line. 10 Since 2010,
Valeant acquired companies with a total value of over $36 billion. 11 Even by this measure then, its "slash and burn" style was reshaping the drug industry. Symptomatically, Valeant was emulating the behavior of activist hedge funds, which characteristically seek in their "engagements" with public firms to reduce the target firm's investment in longer-term projects in favor of maximizing shareholder payout.
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Is there anything wrong or unethical about this behavior? If all Valeant did was to raise prices to extraordinary levels to benefit shareholders, some (and most notably, Milton Friedman) would argue that 10 See Pollack and Tavernise, supra note 7 ("Valeant is known for buying companies and laying off employees to achieve savings, while accumulating a debt of about $30 billion"). These authors further note that Valeant "spends an amount equivalent to only 3 percent of its sales on research and development, which it views as risky and inefficient compared with buying existing drugs" while "traditional big drug companies spend 15 to 20 of sales on research on development.") 11 See Gretchen Morgenson, "Valeant's High-Price Drug Strategy" New York Times, October 2, 2015. 12 A major aim of hedge fund activism has recently been to reduce investment by target companies in long-term investments and particularly in "research and development" investments. See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 573 to 581.
managers were under a duty to do so to maximize profits. 13 At first glance, it may seem that Valeant was such a case in which Valeant was simply maximizing shareholder value by squeezing the last penny out of patients and insurers. Yet, why had not the original owner of the drug done the same? On closer examination, Valeant's success owed much to deceptive behavior, particularly involving its undisclosed relationship with a captive online pharmacy company, Philidor Services, which Valeant held an option to buy. 14 Because Philidor would order Valeant's drugs at an inflated price and bill the insurer, the patient may never have learned of the price spike, and the insurer did not know that Philidor was only a sock puppet for Valeant. Thus, the insurer did not demand that a cheaper generic drug be substituted for
Valeant's higher priced brand name drug. As a New York Times columnist concluded, Valeant used
Philidor "to keep patients from getting generics instead of its high-priced drugs." 15 Although Philidor's seeming independence corroborated Valeant's pricing, it was entirely illusory, as Valeant actually consolidated Philidor's financial results with its own. The relationship between the two firms has spawned a grand jury investigation, and when that investigation was disclosed publicly in late 2015,
Valeant's stock price tanked and insurers refused to deal with Philidor. 16 The point here is that Valeant's hard-nosed, profit-maximizing behavior seems to have involved an element of fraud. Valeant did not simply negotiate a hard bargain with its customers and other stakeholders, but seems to have actually deceived them. When this deception was disclosed, Valeant was disgraced, and its stock price immediately fell by over two-thirds. 13 Milton Friedman, of course, famously argued that the "social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Other senior officers received similar awards. Based on this reward structure, Pearson moved quickly to slash overhead, shrink the research and development budget, and move Valeant to Canada (and a reduced corporate tax rate). Although his tactics worked at first, he brought the company under increasing public and regulatory scrutiny, and scrutiny discovered legal and reputational issues. Eventually, the board was forced to conduct an extended review of the company's financial statements and delay their release.
Ratings agencies downgraded their ratings on Valeant, and under pressure, Pearson resigned.
All this seems fully consistent with the most basic generalization about executive compensation: executives respond to equity awards (and particularly stock options) by taking increased risk.
21 Such incentive also may incline executives to engage in financial misreporting. 22 At Valeant, extreme incentives produced extreme behavior.
We will later return to these two factors: hedge fund pressure and incentive compensation. In truth, they go together, and Valeant is not a case where shareholder pressure alone pushed the company into illegality. Rather, its managers and its shareholders seem both to have been zealously committed to maximize shareholder value in the short-run, for their own reasons. Diversified investors tend to be most interested in voting on issues of generic significance, which affect multiple companies in their portfolio. For example, they may have a generic position to vote against the poison pill or against deviations from a "one-share-one-vote" rule. Or they may favor "proxy access" or "say or pay" proposals. In general, institutional investors tend only to favor broad goals (such as independent boards or environmental policies on climate change), which apply to many firms and can be formulated in general terms. These investors are less likely to be interested in firm-specific issues that require an ad hoc analysis. For example, they would not initiate a shareholder proposal on the following topics: Should XYZ Corporation sell or spinoff its plastic division? Should it terminate its CEO? Should it elect directors opposed to further investments by XYZ in research and development? These are firmspecific issues, and even the largest institutional investors are unlikely to have a pre-existing position on them or much knowledge about the specific company. If the institution holds several hundred companies in its portfolio, researching and coming to an informed decision on all these issues would be logistically burdensome (and the payoff would be small, even if the policy change benefitted the company).
Although the diversified institutional investor will sometimes vote in favor of a firm-specific shareholder proposal raised by some other investor, it will virtually never initiate such a shareholder proposal itself. When it does vote against management, it is likely because its proxy advisor had 36 Little staff is needed, but equally important these firms compete based on low fees (which requires that they be thinly staffed). Professional analysts, most notably Morningstar, Inc., rate mutual funds on their ability to economize on fees and costs, and the published ratings of these analysts are influential in the marketing of mutual funds. 37 For a brief review, see Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 557 to 558. Essentially, the Department of Labor, which administers the ERISA statute, took the position as early as the 1970s that failing to vote shares was a waste of a portfolio asset and implied that the fiduciary was breaching its duty of care. proposals, another class of investor has the opposite incentives. Hedge funds typically have smaller portfolios, and they are under no legal obligation to diversify. 38 Activist funds generally hold only a modest number of stocks (and they make large bets on these). Investors in hedge funds understand that they are accepting high risk in return for a hopefully high return. If a hedge fund holds a thin portfoliosay, six to ten stocks-it has every reason to formulate firm-specific proposals about those companies.
Activist funds are an important (and fairly recent) subset of hedge funds. Originally, hedge funds sold themselves to the market on the claim that, through better research and analysis, they could find "high alpha" stocks. In short, they would be better stock pickers. In reality, some lived up to this standard, but most did not. Other hedge funds marketed themselves as "quantitative" funds that sought to exploit market anomalies through the use of complex algorithms. Again, some succeeded, and others failed. Such funds generally also had limited interest in voting. Eventually, however, some hedge fund managers recognized that attempting to outperform the efficient market over the long run was not a viable strategy. Instead of seeking the best stocks (the "super-alphas"), they could much more easily identify mediocre companies, particularly those with low market value to book value ratios-and attempt to force a sale or break-up of these firms. Put simply, the goal was to realize "negative synergy" (i.e., the difference between the value of the firm's assets and its lower stock price). The key attraction of this approach was that it was relatively simple to identify mediocre companies with a high break-up value.
38 Because a hedge fund is normally exempt from the Investment Company Act under specific statutory exemptions (most notably § §3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act), such a fund is neither subject to that Act's requirement of diversification or its prohibition on incentive compensation to investment managers.
Nor does this approach offend the efficient market hypothesis, because the hedge fund is not simply a stock picker; rather, it is trying to impose a change on the target firm that alters its value.
Negative synergy had also motivated "bust-up" takeovers at the end of the 1980s, but these had been largely stopped by the advent of the "poison pill" and changes in the Delaware case law on takeover defensive tactics. 39 Ironically, some contemporary activist hedge funds are run by persons who were "bust-up" bidders back in the 1980s. 40 This continuity shows that, while bust-up takeovers could be stopped, activists did not abandon their goal, but changed their tactics and resurfaced as hedge funds seeking to vote out the board and then break up the target. Essentially, these activists knew that, in contrast to a takeover, a proxy fight could not be as easily blocked by target management. When did "activist" hedge funds first seek to launch proxy fights aimed at breaking up a company? Although it is always hard to identify the first of anything, such efforts became clearly visible by 2005. 41 After that point, proxy fights aimed at forcing management to sell or spin off assets began to escalate rapidly.
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Hence, by 2010, a company with a low Tobin's Q or a conglomerate structure was a natural target for activist hedge funds. Once the activist fund acquired 5% or more of the target's stock and filed the legally-mandated disclosure (known as a Schedule 13D) with the SEC, this filing elicited a positive and statistically significant market reaction. 43 That, in turn, gave the activist fund the ability to reward its 
. 43 The most complete study of Schedule 13D filings (which covers some 48,902 initial filings) finds an average abnormal return of four percent on a Schedule 13D filing, but more than seven percent on initial such filings. See Ulf Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Jan Schnitzler, "What is Special About Hedge Fund Activism?: Evidence from 13-D Filings, at 2, 25 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506704) (2014); for another study finding a seven percent abnormal allies, because by tipping its intent to conduct a campaign, it could give its allies a virtually riskless profit if they bought the target's shares before the Schedule 13D was filed. In return, the activist fund might expect loyalty from its allies in the ensuing proxy fight.
Activists do not need actually to break the target company up. It was enough to put the target company "in play" and raise its expected takeover premium. In the case of a bust-up takeover, if the takeover bidder were outbid by a rival, the unsuccessful first bidder could still profit handsomely.
Similarly, in the case of a proxy fight, the insurgent could expect a jump in the target's stock price once it filed a Schedule 13D disclosing its ownership of a 5% block or more. The near certainty of such an abnormal gain on disclosure of its stake empowered the hedge fund contestant. Because under U.S. law the hedge fund could under most circumstances lawfully tip other institutions of its plans and anticipate that they would also profit once its stake was disclosed, 44 it held a carrot by which it could assemble a large block of allies, collectively holding a much larger share of the target's stock than it could, itself, afford to buy. This informal association-known as a "wolf pack" in the parlance-often acquires a block that dwarfs the holdings of target management, 45 and this tilted the outcome of the proxy fight in favor of the insurgents, who began to win consistently (nearly 75% of the time in contested proxy battles). . 44 Under Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983), a necessary precondition to insider trading liability is a fiduciary breach. An insider to the company does breach his or her duty to the corporation when the insider trades on material, nonpublic information. But a hedge fund is typically not an insider and owes no duty to the corporation in which it invests. Thus, under most circumstances, the hedge fund would not breach any duty to the target company or its shareholders by indicating in advance to other funds its intent to file a Schedule 13D or start a proxy fight. 45 See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 567-568. 46 In 2014, "activists won a record 73% of battles for board seats in the U.S., up from 52% in 2012." See David Benoit and Kirsten Grant, "Activist Investors' Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds," Wall Street Journal, August 10, 2015. This article finds that activists won one or more seats at a record 107 companies in 2014.
Why did the target's stock price jump on this disclosure? Various reasons can be offered, but the simplest and most plausible is that the company now had a higher expected takeover premium. 47 If there once was a 10% chance of a takeover at a premium, the disclosure of the insurgent's stake raised that possibility significantly, and the market reacted. One careful study finds that further stock price gains after the Schedule 13D's filing depend on their being a follow-up transaction (either a takeover or a significant divestiture). 48 Although some argue that the insurgents can create value by improving management or supplying new ideas and vision, the evidence to date is to the contrary. A further gain in the target's stock price after the initial Schedule 13D disclosure depends on there being a follow-up transaction.
The development of the "wolf pack" tactic and its ability to enable the participants to engage in informed trading based on material non-public information helps explain the hyperbolic rise in "engagements" by activist hedge funds over the last decade. At the same time, it also shows the close association between higher risk activities and activities of dubious morality (i.e., tipping material nonpublic information). In fairness, some activist funds will not share non-public data with potential allies, but the evidence is clear that many do. Now, we approach the central issue: If activist hedge funds are replacing traditional pension funds and mutual funds as the primary catalyst in corporate governance, why does this transition imply a shift in the direction of greater risk tolerance? Why might it also imply a greater willingness to engage in unlawful, dubious, or at least morally problematic means?
Here, we need to begin with an important contrast between diversified and undiversified investors in how they compensate their agents. Hedge fund managers are so extraordinarily well compensated that in some years the top five hedge fund managers have earned more than all S&P 500 firms' CEOs 47 One careful study finds that the excess returns from hedge fund activism are most closely associated with an activist strategy of forcing the target firm into a takeover. They predict that "accounting manipulation or fraud" will occur "more frequently" in the case of younger funds, where the manager can exit with less loss if the manager is unsuccessful.
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The point here is not that hedge funds are evil, amoral or dangerous, but that in their "engagements" with public corporations, they will be regularly pushing the firms they engage toward higher leverage and riskier strategies. Because they are today the driving force behind shareholder activism, this implies that activism is increasingly leading to greater risk.
B. The Changing Board: The Rise of "Blockholder" Directors
Classically, nominees for the board of directors of a public company are selected by an independent nominating committee, whose decisions the shareholders usually ratify. The nominating committee of such a company understands that it owes fiduciary duties to all the shareholders, not just to some special subset of them. The style of the public company board was collegial, and consensus was generally sought. That pattern may, however, be rapidly changing.
Although the law remains that directors owe duties to all the shareholders, the new development is the appearance of the "blockholder director"-a director selected by insurgents and typically placed on the board as part of a settlement that averts a proxy fight. Between 2004 and 2012, Gow, Shin, and Srinivasan identify some 824 "activist" directors at public companies who were appointed to the board in response to demands by activists. 55 Of these, 167 were elected in actual proxy contests, and 646 were appointed to the board as the result of a settlement without a contested shareholder vote. 56 This steep ratio shows that companies have learned that it is wiser to settle than to fight. Moreover, of this 824 total, some 346 (or 42%) were "affiliated" in the sense of being a principal or an employee of the activist fund making the demand, while 478 (or 58%) were unaffiliated. 57 Thus, in the case of the 346 "affiliated" Even if we use this lower figure (678) , that number represents nearly 97% of the 710 new directors at these firms. 59 The new route to the boardroom appears to be that of serving as the candidate of an activist fund, and the role of the nominating committee is thus being eclipsed.
What does the presence of one or more "blockholder" directors, who made it to the board as a result of pressure from activists, do to board cohesion? My own sense is that in the case of the larger public corporation, the blockholder directors will resemble the other independent directors and will have substantial business pedigrees involving high executive positions or other notable achievements. At smaller firms, however, the blockholder directors will frequently be hedge fund employees, whose loyalty will likely be to their employer. This may well change board dynamics and reduce the collegiality and cohesion of the board. But, to the extent that the board wishes to act in a consensus-seeking manner, a block of two or three such directors seems likely to have real impact and blocking position on many issues.
At least for the immediate future, hedge fund activism seems more likely to grow than to subside.
The first half of 2016 saw 306 activist campaigns in the U.S., up from 278 in 2015. 60 The most frequent activist demand was for board representation, and companies generally negotiated a compromise, rather than risk the humiliation of defeat in a proxy contest. Other impacts of this change in compensation are less obvious. Inefficient mergers or mergers in which the acquirer overpays are no longer attractive to managers, because they reduce the stock price.
More importantly, the CEO's interests are now well aligned with those of the hedge fund activist; both want to maximize the stock prize. Given this alignment, the board's ability or willingness to pay its traditional role as the corporate superego may be compromised. Dispersed ownership arose first in the United States and later in the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, it has appeared, but it is not the norm. In the U.S., the three most plausible explanations for dispersed ownership are:
(1) A merger wave from 1890 to 1910 combined large corporations into giant firms in response to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlawed price-fixing and collusion, but not mergers that created market power. Investment bankers and others saw the advantages (for shareholders) in forming firms that dominated their industry and spared shareholders from "cutthroat competition" between rival firms. 65 The formation of U.S. Steel by J.P. Morgan is one of the clearest examples, as are numerous railroad mergers.
(2) Seeking to encourage retail ownership (and increased business for its brokers), the New York Stock Exchange began a campaign around 1900 to assure investors that firms listed on it were safer and sounder than firms traded elsewhere. 66 To this end, it mandated financial disclosures (such as audited financial statements) that no other exchange had required. Later in the 1920s, some large commercial 65 For an overview of this and other theories, see John C. Coffee During this era, compensation was mainly in cash. Compensation levels also remained fairly low, possibly because of confiscatory tax rates in mid-Century America and possibly because of the political embarrassment that might result from high CEO salaries during the Depression Era and World War II eras.
Critics of "managerialism" argued that management in this era did not profit-maximize, but only "profit-satisficed." 70 Partly, such a policy reduced risk, but even more, it balanced the interests of various constituencies. Because dispersed shareholders held little power, management was equally responsive to the interests of creditors, employees and local communities-all of whom were likely in closer personal contact with management. Payout to shareholders remained a secondary concern, at least so long as some "satisfactory" increase in revenues could be reported. Late in this era, as stock options came into use, management became more attentive to their company's stock price, but it was only a relative change. Not until 1990 did a majority of the board at U.S. public corporations come to be composed of independent outside directors. 71 Until then, board oversight was probably more nominal than real.
The era of the managerial corporation came to an end in the 1980s, as the result of four interrelated trends:
(1) The rise of institutional investors, who rose from holding only 5% of the shares in the early 1950s to a majority by the end of the 1980s;
(2) The advent of the hostile takeover, which arose in the 1980s and came to focus on dismantling conglomerate firms, largely to realize negative synergy; 70 Under the "behavioral model" of the firm, which was first developed by Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon, managers did not "profit maximize," but rather "profit satisficed"-that is, they earned the level of profits that would satisfy their investors and keep them in office. By the mid-1980s, the dominant players in the corporate governance environment were pension funds and mutual funds. Not only did they own the majority of the stock of public firms, but their desire for high liquidity led them to concentrate their investments on the largest firms where they owned even higher percentages (usually 70% or more). Thus, their influence was greatest at the Fortune 500 level.
One impact of their rise was a concomitant shift toward majority independent boards at public companies. This was the type of generalized goal that diversified investors could support because it applied universally and did not require ad hoc analysis. As the diagram below shows, sometime between 1985 and 1990, independent directors came to compose a majority of the board at public corporations:
Still, by law and by choice, both mutual and pension funds were diversified, and their large portfolios implied little interest on their part in true firm-specific issues. To understand this, imagine that the cost of a proxy fight might be several million dollars and that both mutual and pension funds rarely held more than 2% of the stock of a portfolio firm. Even if that company pursued a highly inadvisable policy, the multi-million dollar costs of such a proxy campaign were likely to exceed 2% of the projected benefits of the campaign. Nor was there any established mechanism for sharing the costs of activism among all shareholders (or even among all institutional holders). To be sure, it was virtually costless to vote "no" on a management proposal or to vote in favor of a proposal brought by some other shareholder (for example, a possible takeover bidder). As a result, activism was largely confined to resisting management proposals and voting with those insurgent proposals that were brought.
Some important developments did occur during this period. The rise of proxy advisors (most notably, ISS) did reduce the costs of shareholder coordination. Also, institutions learned to use SEC Rule 14a-8 to make low-cost shareholder proposals, 73 but these proposals were largely precatory, rather than binding. Thus, institutions could coordinate at low cost to support a shareholder proposal, but these usually related to a broader public policy issue (such as climate change or discrimination) or to broader procedural governance issues (such as separating the CEO and board chair positions). Also, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled at the end of this period that shareholders could not amend the bylaws so as to limit the board's power where the board was itself acting in pursuit of its fiduciary obligations. 74 This effectively seemed to mean that shareholders were largely confined to non-binding, precatory votes on shareholder proposals.
The barrier to greater shareholder activism was not just the high cost of a proxy campaign, but also the thin staffs at both mutual funds and pension funds. Mutual funds competed in terms of their ability to minimize costs (which Morningstar publicly rated), and firm-specific activism required serious and expensive staff work. Private pension funds had little interest in supporting shareholder activism (because it might someday disrupt their own company), and public pension funds, while interested, were chronically underfunded. As a result, shareholder activism that would propose firm-specific changes at individual firms had to await a different champion.
C. Stage Three: Hedge Funds Emerge As The New Catalyst of Shareholder Activism
73 Under SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8, a shareholder may place a proposal on the corporation's proxy statement (thus sparing the shareholder the cost of preparing and distributing its own proxy statement), but only if the proposal is considered a "proper subject" for shareholder action under state law. Generally, precatory proposals and certain proposals to amend the corporation's bylaws are considered proper subjects for shareholder action. But see text and note infra at note 74. 74 See C.A., Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A. 2d 227 (Del. 2008) (finding that a shareholder adopted bylaw was invalid because it sought to restrict the board's discretion where the board asserted an obligation to act in pursuit of its fiduciary duties). The pace soon increased, and the period from 2010 to early 2014 witnessed 1,115 "activist"
campaigns. 77 Despite substantial setbacks for some of the best-known activist funds in 2015, the first six months of 2016 still saw a record level of activist campaigns.
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Behind this accelerating curve lie some basic institutional differences between mutual funds and hedge funds: (1) Hedge funds are basically undiversified, and most hold relatively small portfolios in terms of the number of stocks held; (2) Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds typically have significant staffs; originally, they focused on finding undervalued stocks, but they are equally capable of identifying firms where management changes might unlock negative synergy or provoke a sale to a new bidder; and (3)
Hedge funds employ compensation formulas that incentivize their managers to accept high risk.
These differences quickly surfaced in activist campaigns. Using their larger staffs, activist hedge funds quickly developed a protocol under which they would prepare a lengthy "White Paper," assessing the target company and offering a recommended strategy. Often this paper would be several hundred pages (and supplemented by PowerPoint slides). This both placed the burden on management to respond and allowed the activist to convince diversified institutions that its plans at least justified giving it some minority representation on the board. Because they were not required to contribute to the costs of the 75 See text and notes supra at notes 38 to 47. 76 See Briggs, supra note 41, at 685-696. 77 See Coffee and Palia, supra note 6, at 554-555 (citing various studies). 78 See Wescott, supra note 60.
campaign, diversified investors were generally happy to free ride on the activist's efforts. Also, to the extent that the target had underperformed the market, diversified investors were sympathetic to some change at the target. "What's the harm?" was their standard question of management. 79 But the presence of even a handful of minority directors did change board dynamics.
The darker side of this new activism involves its reliance on tipping. 80 Either by tipping favored funds of their intentions or by allowing other funds to observe them and infer their intentions, some activists learned to attract pre-announcement allies-some open and some hidden-, which enabled them to assemble larger coalitions of shareholders. Once the "wolf pack" tactic was perfected, hedge funds became far more potent insurgents than any other class of insurgent (other than the hostile bidder) had ever been. Other activists do not tip allies in advance of public disclosure, but the practice seems widespread.
The bottom line then is that the world looks bright for hedge fund activists; as they have many advantages. Activists can economize on their costs, and they use a proxy fight only as their weapon of last resort. Negotiations are conducted in the shadow of such a hostile option. Unlike the hostile bidder, who could be halted (at least for a time) by the poison pill, the activist hedge fund can outflank that defensive stratagem. By assembling a de facto coalition that could not be described as a "group" under the SEC's definition of that term, they escaped the reach of the poison pill, which usually limited how much stock a "group" could acquire.
Further, the activist fund could profit in ways that the hostile bidder could not. It did not need to seek control; rather it could seek only to put the target "in play" for another bidder to acquire. Acquiring itself a far smaller stake than a hostile bidder, it needed less capital, and it could also bail out more 79 The author has been so advised by multiple investment bankers active in this field who have been so advised by institutional investors that they lobbied. 80 See Yu Ting Forester Wong, "Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism," (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2721413)(2016). This author finds that lead activists do appear to tip their favorite trading partners prior to the public disclosure of the filing of the Schedule 13D and that this practice accounts for a sizable "wolf pack" that owns a substantial percentage of the target's stock and thus increases the lead activist's probability of success.
quickly (and at a profit) if it saw little hope of the target being acquired. Finally, by seeking board representation, it could seek to itself run (or at least influence) the auction for the target, turning the acquisition from a hostile bid into a much safer "friendly" one.
In short, given these advantages, it should be little surprise then that activist campaigns continue to increase.
V. Activism and Social Responsibility
Much (but not all) of the academic literature on hedge fund activism applauds its rise, because many academics see the underlying corporate governance issues as involving only the familiar tensions between managers and shareholders. 81 To be sure, their interests do conflict, and arguably activism has reduced agency costs. But it is myopic to stop there. Other stakeholders have interests that are also placed at risk by hedge fund activism. The clearest example is probably creditors. Much evidence shows that creditors do foreseeably lose when activists begin to gain control, because hedge fund activism typically results in greater leverage and thus an uncompensated increase in risk for existing creditors. 82 Accordingly, creditors have incentives to adopt measures that protect themselves and even to pay concessions to shareholders for such protections (as we will see shortly). In the case of employees, the evidence is a little less clear, but some studies show that activism does result in reductions in the firm's total number of employees. 83 More speculative is the impact of activism on other, more inchoate constituencies, such as customers and local communities, but Valeant certainly provides one illustration of a case where those interests were also injured. Ultimately, the real difference between these latter constituencies and creditors is that non-creditor stakeholders have less ability than creditors to contract with the corporation and embed protections in their agreements.
Some will reply: "So what? It is management's duty to pursue the interests of shareholders only and maximize share value!" Actually, that overstates by a wide margin. Both Delaware cases and other authoritative commentaries recognize that the board can make reasonable provisions for the interests of other stakeholders. 84 No case or statute has ever insisted the board is under a duty to maximize share value (at least in the short run). Still, even if the board can consider the interests of other constituencies, boards under the pressure of activist funds may be less able or willing to do so.
In this light, what principled positions exist that explain why the board should be able to protect other stakeholders when their interests conflict with those of shareholders? Even more importantly, how can such a principled position be reflected in realistic policies that can be effectively implemented? This section will consider two possibilities.
A. Efficient Contracting: How the Board and Stakeholders Might Contract
Imagine that some creditors negotiate a contractual protection with the corporation that protects them from what they see as opportunistic behavior by hedge fund activists and that the result is to increase corporate cash flow without reducing the value of the firm. This outcome is exactly contrary to 84 Even in the face of a lucrative takeover bid, the Delaware Supreme Court has ruled in its famous Unocal decision that a target board may take defensive measures based on a concern for "the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community generally)." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (1985) . This is a clear recognition that the interests of stakeholders may be considered, even when it may cost shareholders a significant gain. The American Law Institute has generalized this position in Section 2.01 ("The objective and conduct of the corporation") of its PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994), which is its restatement-like effort to codify the law of fiduciary duties. Initially, its states in Section 2.01(a) that "a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." But then it adds the important qualification in §2.01(b) that: "(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation in the conduct of its businesses… may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business;" In short the board of Valeant could decide, consistent with its fiduciary duties to shareholders, that it was irresponsible to spike the price of a life-saving drug by 500%.
what academics with a tunnel vision focused on manager/shareholder conflicts predict will happen. In their view, any such contractual protection is simply a disguised takeover defense, which entrenches management and therefore must reduce the value of the firm.
But the latest evidence seemingly contradicts the standard academic view. In two recent papers, Professors Griffith and Reisel study a recent contractual innovation in corporate debt securities known as "Dead Hand Proxy Puts" that has clearly been designed to deter hedge fund activism. 85 Technically, the Dead Hand Proxy Put updates a standard "change of control" provision in loan agreements and bond indentures that provided for acceleration of corporate indebtedness upon certain defined "changes in control" to include a new triggering event: the election of nominees of hedge fund activists to a majority of the positions on the corporation's board. Further, in order to cover the now typical scenario of directors being added to the board as the result of a settlement with these activists, the provision expressly provides that this acceleration provision cannot be waived by the board (and this makes the put a "dead hand" provision in the parlance because it is beyond the power of the board to modify).
At first glance, this sounds like an anti-takeover defense. But now add a key fact: creditors reduce the cost of credit to corporations that adopt Dead Hand Poison Puts. In their study, Griffith and
Reiser examine a sample of bank loans from 1994 through 2014 and find that the reduction in loan spreads was statistically significant. 86 The cost of debt was reduced by approximately 60 basis points, and the authors estimate that the average annual saving in interest costs for the corporation was $22 million per year. 87 Moreover, not only does the Dead Hand Poison Put reduce the cost of borrowing to the corporation, but the adoption of such a provision did not result in any reduction in the firm's stock 85 See Sean J. Griffith and Natalia Reisel, "Dead Hand Proxy Puts, Hedge Fund Activism, and the Cost of Capital," (http://ssrn.com/abstract=______(June 2016)(hereinafter, "Griffith and Reisel I"); Sean J. Griffith and Natalia Reisel, "Dead Hand Proxy Puts and Firm Value: Efficient Contracting in the Shadow of Hedge Fund Activism" (Working Paper, July 2016)(hereinafter, "Griffith and Reisel II"). 86 See Griffith and Reisel I at 26-27. 87 Id at 27. The authors acknowledge that this $22 million estimate involves a "rough calculation." price, thereby demonstrating that shareholders suffered no loss. 88 Thus, this seems a win/win bargain for both creditors and shareholders, as the former receive needed protections against a possible future danger and shareholders get cheaper credit.
Griffith and Reisel view the use of this innovation as an example of efficient contracting.
89
Creditors and managers have struck a good deal for both shareholders and creditors that mitigates the possibility of future opportunistic behavior by activists. Nonetheless, the Delaware courts have been skeptical and have suggested (but not yet held) that the adoption of such a provision may amount to a breach of the board's fiduciary duty. 90 As a result, Dead Hand Proxy Puts are more used outside of Delaware. Griffith and Reisel report that during 2015, 103 corporations incorporated outside of Delaware adopted such provisions, while Delaware companies adopted 48 such provisions over the same period-a more than 2:1 margin.
91
Delaware's skepticism may reflect the same myopic obsession with protecting shareholders from management entrenchment that characterizes much of the academic literature on corporate governance.
Both miss the possibility that the board can play an umpire-like role, protecting stakeholders without damaging shareholders by reducing firm value.
But only some stakeholders can contract efficiently with the corporation. In the case of creditors, Griffith and Reisel find that although loan agreements contained Dead Hand Proxy Puts, bond indentures seldom did-even though bondholders also benefitted when such a provision was inserted into the 88 See Griffith and Reisel II at 37-38. In fact, they find that "shareholders react positively to the filing of loan contracts with Dead Hand Proxy Puts" and that "this reaction is statistically significant at the 5% level and, in the case of median raw equity returns, at the 1% level. and shareholders in a way that deters activists but does not reduce firm value, should the board be more broadly authorized to do so, even when the compromise cannot be embedded in a formal contract? To move beyond the simpler case of creditors, should the board also be able to make a commitment to its employees that may benefit the corporation (by assuring labor tranquility or cheaper wages) and that does not reduce firm value, but does deter activists. In principle, the answer should be yes, and the answer should not turn on whether the deal can be set forth in a formal contract. But such an answer does require enhanced judicial review to make certain that stakeholders have a legitimate interest and that both sides actually benefit (or at least that the intent was to achieve such an outcome). A mere business judgment standard of review would not be adequate to this task. Still, Delaware has long followed the Unocal standard, which requires the board in adopting an antitakeover measure to show both a "threat" to corporate interests and a response that was "reasonable" in relation to that threat. 94 Under such a standard, Dead Hand Proxy Puts should regularly survive judicial scrutiny.
To sum up, this section has argued that if some stakeholders can legitimately contract with the corporation to protect themselves from the adverse consequences to them of an activist takeover, the board should be able to act on behalf of those other stakeholders not in a position to contract. But the test should look to whether the board is mediating a conflict between stakeholders and shareholders in a way that can be expected to benefit the corporation. Let's return to the Valeant fact pattern and assume that a hypothetical drug company has purchased an established drug for $10 million and can mark up its price by 500% so that it earns a $20 million return on its investment within two years. 95 Assume further that no fraud or deception is involved, and, on these facts, this clearly is not a case where efficient contracting could enable both sides to realize reciprocal benefits. Here, our hypothetical firm expects to make a bonanza, but only if it spikes the drug's price.
To ethicists, such behavior is amoral at the least. But what is the appropriate answer to those, who, like Milton Friedman, insist that the corporation is under a duty to maximize its profits for shareholders? 96 Technically, there may in fact be no such legal duty to maximize profits (at least over the short run 97 ), but that response does not answer how the board can justify not favoring its shareholders'
interests.
How can the board justify foregoing this profit? The best answer may be that the board believes that its own shareholders on normative grounds would not want the firm to deal this harshly with its customers. But how can we say this when institutional investors are buying the stock of our hypothetical firm precisely because this strategy is so profitable? Here, we come to the key point: these intermediaries (pension funds and mutual funds mainly) are themselves agents, and not the ultimate investor. Do these intermediaries adequately represent the true interests of these funds' beneficial owners? All that can be fairly said is that we do not know. Our contemporary system of corporate governance relies on agents to implement the investors' right of franchise. Agents monitor agents: the board monitors management, and institutional shareholders monitor the company's board. But who monitors the agents at institutional shareholders who make voting decisions on behalf of their beneficial owners? The short answer is that no 95 Why is this possible? Various reasons can be given, including that the seller may have been a corporation with a strong corporate superego that would not mark up the drug's price 500%, but would sell the drug to other firms. Or the selling firm may just have simply feared the adverse publicity that Valeant received. 96 See Friedman, supra note 11. 97 See text and note supra at note 84.
independent outsider does this. In that light, one can question whether these agents' decisions truly reflect the views and values of the ultimate beneficial owners.
Even if this question cannot be answered with confidence, some evidence points to a likelihood that the two groups (agents and ultimate owners) have very different attitudes. Although there is relatively little research on values and social attitudes in corporate governance, one important study surveyed all the directors and CEOs of public companies in one country (Sweden). 98 It found strong differences in the values and beliefs between directors committed to "shareholderism" and directors favoring "stakeholderist" stances, but it further observed that even directors personally favoring "stakeholders" found themselves under strong role pressure to vote instead in favor of shareholders.
99
Other studies have similarly reported that directors often feel trapped by their traditional legal responsibility to the shareholders. 100 The fact that directors favor shareholders over stakeholders (even with misgivings) will surprise few. At the pension fund level, however, it seems more anomalous that those who vote on behalf of pension funds favor shareholders over stakeholders because the actual beneficiaries of pension funds (i.e., employees) may be logically more stakeholder-oriented than shareholder-oriented.
Should the pension fund's trustees and agents, representing employees, behave differently than other institutional shareholders and show greater loyalty to stakeholders? Legally, this is a complicated issue. Traditionally, trustees are not required to follow instructions from beneficiaries (at least where the beneficiaries are not unanimous), and trustees must act in the "best interests" of their beneficiaries. In theory, one could pass the voting rights at the pension fund through to the beneficial owners, but as a practical matter, such a "pass through" is entirely infeasible and would be a radical change. Not only would it be costly, but most beneficial owners will have even less interest in voting on most issues than the retail shareholder (who is generally assumed to be rationally apathetic).
Possibly, less drastic measures may be feasible. Directors could attempt to learn the preferences of beneficial owners and use it as a justification for resisting pressures from activists. For example, the target corporation might attempt to reach the beneficial owners in an attempt to influence the actual pension fund directors. To give an illustration, assume that the board and management of a large corporation that is being challenged by activist funds attempts to reach (through the media) the beneficial owners of CalPERS in order that their protests might deter CalPERS directors from voting for the funds' nominees. Would that work? Or would it backfire? No one really knows today, but this is the one leverage point that has not yet been exploited. Conceivably, pension funds could form advisory committees of their beneficial owners to review and monitor their voting behavior. This would, however, require recognition of this misalignment, which is still a tension more repressed than recognized.
At a minimum, however, corporate boards can justify acting as a corporate superego on the ground that they believe their company's ultimate investors want them to behave in this fashion. The premise here is only that beneficial owners share the values of their society. Although this is a sound normative argument, the problem is that it does not protect such directors from ouster by activist funds that disagree.
To sum up, the great anomaly in corporate governance today is that institutional investors (and particularly pension funds) vote and behave as if they (1) had little or no interest in normative issues about the behavior of their portfolio companies, and (2) were systematically pro-shareholder and anti-
stakeholder. Yet, their beneficial owners likely have very different preferences. This tension is softened and ameliorated to the extent that corporate boards can act as the firm's superego, but the survival of that role is in question.
C. Strengthening the Corporate Superego
Public corporations are required to have adequate internal controls, but this idea has not been taken very far in terms of implementation. What more could be done? Consider the following measures:
1. The corporation's chief legal officer could be made to report directly to the board (or its audit committee). 105 The outside auditor already does so by virtue of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the idea here would be to insulate the chief legal officer from managerial pressure (either to ignore evidence of illegal or fraudulent conduct or to fail to report it to the audit committee). So insulated, the chief legal officer could not be terminated by the CEO, but only by the board.
2.
All corporate officers and employees could be subjected by a corporate bylaw or policy statement to an obligation that they report credible evidence of misconduct, illegality or fraud to the audit committee. Today, Federal law only prohibits retaliation against whistle-blowers, but nothing typically compels the employee to be an internal whistleblower and report misconduct upward within the company. 106 3. The corporation could even offer financial rewards to the employee who reports to the audit committee. From a practical and hard-nosed perspective, the corporation might be willing to do so because it prefers that a whistle-blower goes to it, rather than to the Government. Records would need to be kept internally as to the information received and the responses made to it.
4.
Periodic legal audits could be required to review the company's legal exposure. Such audits would report to the audit committee not just whether the law had been violated, but where the company had the greatest exposure to future legal problems. Again, this would be costly, but here the Bar, eager for the business, would probably be supportive.
The net effect of these measures is hard to estimate and could be modest, but it would change the functional activity of the audit committee, moving it from simply a monitor of financial performance to a more investigative body. To be sure, it would be costly, but involvement in crime is ultimately even more so.
D. Corporate Governance and Structure: Possible Reforms
A number of commentators have announced their diagnoses that hedge fund activism has pressured public companies into an excessive focus on the short-run, and they have then proposed a variety of reforms. 107 A notable example is Colin Mayer, who would recognize a new specialized "trust corporation" that would limit liquidity and effectively require long-term holding. 108 Although this approach might well work, it comes at a high price for institutional investors in terms of the necessary sacrifice of liquidity. Probably, the closest "real world" equivalent to Colin Mayer's "trust corporation"
is the new "public benefit corporation," which expressly identifies the purposes other than shareholder gain for which the corporation is founded and authorizes the board to balance between the interests of that limited context? Congress is unlikely to regulate compensation, as corporate governance has traditionally been seen as a matter for state regulation. Possibly more disclosure and comparative analysis could be required. Credit rating agencies could also be compelled or induced to consider this factor in rating the firm's debt securities. Optimists may believe that other companies will also learn from
Valeant's example and avoid creating compensation formulas that invite disaster. Nonetheless, one must be skeptical here about the likelihood of significant reform.
VI. Conclusion
We have moved, or are at least moving, from a board-centric system of corporate governance to a shareholder-centric system. For our purposes, this recognition has two major implications: (1)
Corporations may be less law compliant and more risk-tolerant in this brave new world; and (2)
Stakeholders are increasingly exposed to loss from short-term activism.
This new reality that constituencies other than shareholders may desire (and need) judicial protection poses a considerable challenge for courts, which have long focused almost exclusively on shareholder protection. 115 The traditional judicial rationale for this attitude of shareholder primacy was that only the dispersed and largely powerless shareholders truly depended on the board, while other constituencies could protect themselves by contract or other protections. That rationale was always overstated, but today it makes even less sense. Fearing real injury, stakeholders will today offer improved terms if they can be protected from prospective opportunism. Dead Hand Proxy Puts provide an example of such bilateral negotiations that improve the positions of both sides. Yet, many other stakeholders cannot similarly so contract. Here, it still may be in the corporation's long-term interests to protect such exposed stakeholders from opportunistic behavior. Thus, when courts view new devices skeptically (such as the proxy put 116 ) because they believe their first obligation is to protect shareholders from managerial entrenchment, these courts may be revealing an outdated understanding of contemporary corporate governance.
In the last analysis, can ethicists and economists agree on much? Certainly, agreement should be possible on two points: First, ethical failures are often the product of perverse incentives embodied in compensation formulas that overly reward risk-taking. Second, from an ex ante perspective, it is wiser for the board to engage in efficient long-term contracting with other stakeholders than to permit shareholders to exploit ex post every opportunity on which stakeholder interests can be subordinated to shareholder interests. But, even assuming agreement on these two points, neither takes us that far toward a satisfactory resolution. Also, a third area where agreement should be possible has more pessimistic implications: In the absence of structural or governance reforms that today seem unlikely, collisions between the ethical course and the economically value-maximizing course are increasingly predictable.
If that is true and if we wish the board to play the role of corporate superego, how do we justify the board assuming such a role and rejecting Milton Friedman's edict that boards should maximize profits for shareholders? Phrased differently, how does one answer the claim that it is anti-democratic and elitist for the board to substitute its own moral values for those of its shareholders? The short answer is that no one knows the actual preferences of the ultimate beneficiaries because our existing system of agents keeps them hidden. We live today in an age of "Intermediary Capitalism," in which beneficial ownership is divorced from any voice in the firm. 117 In response, the board can and should be able to act on its believe that it is representing the views of a "silent majority"-i.e., the company's ultimate beneficial holders at pension and mutual funds.
Once one postulates that there is such a silent majority (or, more simply, that short-term activists do not truly represent all the shareholders), the more the board becomes entitled to define its role as a counterbalancing force and to take a normative perspective. The real issue is not whether the board should play such a superego role, but whether it can effectively do so in a world where the shareholders can today more easily remove the board than in the past. The answer here is in doubt and may ultimately depend on whether diversified investors come to recognize that their interests are not always well aligned with those of activist investors. That will be a continuing story.
The bottom line is that ethics and the economic goal of shareholder wealth maximization will remain in tension, with activist hedge funds exacerbating the friction. But, there are ways-limited to be sure-of mediating this conflict if courts will view their role from a wider perspective that sees more than shareholder interests at stake. For the long-run, however, governance reforms (such as tenured voting and restrictions on incentive compensation) may be the better answer.
Realists will answer that most of the reforms discussed above are not feasible in at least the shortrun. Perhaps they are not, but, if so, the problem of the diminished corporate superego seems likely to get worse, before it gets better. 
